Generally accepted principles of effective corporate governance have taken hold in the context of different models of governance, whose implementation is also linked to the share structure of the companies and to the dynamics of risk’s capital markets. Global companies need a global approach in the acquisition of consensus and financial resources, first of all through a correct development of the corporate governance activities and promoting a market-driven management inspired by long-term sustainable development. In this context, the growing importance of sustainability and the concept of global responsibility in the relationships with stakeholders join together with the convergence of corporate governance rules, reducing the gap between insider and outsider systems. This paper, by means of a research on the first ten most capitalised companies listed in countries characterized by different capital market orientation and corporate governance models (Usa, UK, Germany, France and Italy), aims to underlines the relations between these two to deepen the requisites for a more effective and sustainable governance.
This study contributes in the existing literature to emphasize the importance of corporate governance approaches inspired on sustainability in the capital markets. A governance oriented to sustainability implies significant changes in the relationships with company’s stakeholders, shareholders in particular, promoting a trend of convergence between insider and outsiders systems.
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