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Games Review

June 2017, Volume 3, 1, pp 1-5

A Brief Survey of the House Allocation Problems

Ipek Gursel Tapki

,

Elif Akben Selcuk

Ipek Gursel Tapki 1
Elif Akben Selcuk 2

  1. Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey 1

  2. Faculty of Management, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Turkey 2

Pages: 1-5

DOI: 10.18488/journal.100.2017.31.1.5

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Article History:

Received: 23 May, 2017
Revised: 17 July, 2017
Accepted: 28 July, 2017
Published: 07 August, 2017


Abstract:

The objective of this paper is to briefly review house allocation problems. We first give the definition and the aim of the mechanism design theory. Next we discuss its applications to markets with no monetary transfer, such as house allocation, kidney exchange and school choice. We review the literature for (i) house allocation problems, (ii) house allocation problems with existing tenants, and (iii) house allocation problems with existing tenants and newcomers.

Contribution/ Originality
The paper’s primary contribution is to review important studies about the house allocation problems. It covers three different versions of these problems, standard house allocation problems, with existing tenants, and with existing tenants and newcomers.

Keywords:

Mechanism design, Game theory, House allocation, Housing market., Matching, Random serial dictatorship.

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Reference:

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Funding:

This study received no specific financial support.

Competing Interests:

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Acknowledgement:

Both authors contributed equally to the conception and design of the study.

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