Games Review

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Online ISSN: 2520-7644
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No. 1

Agent-Based Simulation of Contribution Games

Pages: 11-28
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Agent-Based Simulation of Contribution Games

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DOI: 10.18488/journal.100/2015.1.1/100.1.11.28

Miklos N. Szilagyi

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Miklos N. Szilagyi (2015). Agent-Based Simulation of Contribution Games. Games Review, 1(1): 11-28. DOI: 10.18488/journal.100/2015.1.1/100.1.11.28
Agent-based simulation was performed for various contribution games. The amount of contribution can be constant or variable and the first few contributions are less, more, or equally important than the last few. We found that the results strongly depend on the participating agents’ personalities. Two types of personalities were investigated: Pavlovian and greedy. Our simple formula (Equation 2) provides valuable information about the outcomes of N-person games for Pavlovian agents.



Contribution/ Originality
This study uses a new approach to the study of contribution games and provides new results.

Emergent Behavior of “Rational” Agents in Some Forgotten N-Person Games

Pages: 1-10
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Emergent Behavior of “Rational” Agents in Some Forgotten N-Person Games

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DOI: 10.18488/journal.100/2015.1.1/100.1.1.10

Miklos N Szilagyi

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Miklos N Szilagyi (2015). Emergent Behavior of “Rational” Agents in Some Forgotten N-Person Games. Games Review, 1(1): 1-10. DOI: 10.18488/journal.100/2015.1.1/100.1.1.10
This paper investigates N-person games with linear payoff functions, which are defined by four parameters each for the case when some of these parameters are equal to each other. Such cases represent transitions between different games. The participating agents are all greedy simpletons who imitate the behavior of the neighbor in their Moore neighborhood - nine neighbors, including themselves - that received the highest reward in the previous iteration. The results show that the solutions are non-trivial and represent quite irregular emergent behavior when the payoff functions are equal or cross each other.
Contribution/ Originality
The paper contributes the first logical analysis of borderline N-person games.